IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS

DATED: 08/07/2003

CORAM

THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE V.KANAGARAJ

SECOND APPEAL NO.1244 OF 1991

Tmt.Devikarani ... Appellant

-Vs-

1.Srinivasa Iyer (died)
2.Mrs.Pattammal
3.Mrs.Rukmani
4.S.Balu
5.Mrs.Kala ... Respondents

(Respondents 2 to 5 brought on
record as L.Rs. of the deceased
first respondent as per Order of
the Court dated 24.4.2003 made in
C.M.P.No.19245 of 2002)

Second appeal preferred under Section 100 C.P.C. for the reliefs as
stated therein.

!For appellant : Mr.R.N.Kothandaraman

^For respondent : Mr.G.R.Swaminathan

:JUDGMENT
The above second appeal is directed against the judgment and
decree dated 15.11.1990 rendered in A.S.No.25 of 1990 by the Court of
Subordinate Judge, Nagapattinam thereby reversing the judgment and decree
dated 5.5.1989 rendered in O.S.No.343 of 1982 by the Court of District Munsif,
Thiruvarur.

2. Plaintiff is the appellant herein. She filed the suit
before the trial Court for partition and separate possession of her 5/12th
share in 'A' schedule house property by metes and bounds and for future
profits from the date of plaint till delivery of possession with future
interest and for costs on averments such as that the property mentioned in 'A'
schedule originally belonged to one Velu Pillai, who died in 1938 and the
property described in schedule 'B' represents one half of the 'A' schedule
property; that the said Velu Pillai had three daughters viz. Sengamalam,
Govindammal and Packiri Ammal; that the said Velu Pillai executed a Will in a

sound disposing state of mind on 29.4.1914 and it was his last Will and testament thereby dividing the 'A' schedule house into two halves and bequeathing the 'B' schedule property (it is also the 'B' schedule property in the Will) in favour of Govindammal and her son Govindasamy and the other half was given to his another daughter Packiri Ammal under 'C' schedule to the Will; that the testament directed that the 'B' schedule property bequeathed to Govindammal and her son Govindasamy should be enjoyed by them without any powers of alienation and after their death, the same should be taken by her heirs that Govindasamy predeceased Govindammal; that even though Govindammal had only a life estate, she executed a settlement deed in favour of her grand daughter Rajalakshmi, who in turn sold the property to the vendor of the defendant viz. Lakshmi Bai.

3. The plaintiff would further submit that Govindammal had three daughters viz. Annapoorani, Kamalambal and Pattammal and the said Rajalakshmi is the daughter of Pattammal; that Annapoorani, one of the daughters of Govindammal, filed a suit in O.S.No.222 of 1974 on the file of the Court of District Munsif, Tiruvarur for possession of her 1/3 rd share in the 'B' schedule property against Rajalakshmi, Lakshmi Bai, Kamalambal, Pattammal and Sanbahavalli Ammal who were interested in the suit property and she lost the said suit both in the trial Court and the first appellate Court; that thereupon the said Annapoorani preferred a Second Appeal in S.A.No.660 of 1970 before this Court wherein the defendant in the present suit got himself impleaded as the 6th respondent and since the said Annapoorani died during the pendency of the said Second Appeal, her daughter and son Gowri Ammal and Dakshinamurthi were impleaded as appellants and this Court, by its judgment dated 2.2.1973, held that Govindammal had only a life estate in the 'B' schedule property and that she had no right to execute a settlement deed in favour of Rajalakshmi and granted a decree for 1/3rd share in the 'B' schedule property in favour of Annapoorani's daughter and son Gowri Ammal and Dakshinamurthi and the said decree is binding on the defendant as he was a party to the same; that it was further held insofar as the property bequeathed to Packiri Ammal is concerned ('C' schedule to the Will) that no limitation was imposed on Packiri Ammal and the defendant appears to have purchased that portion of the property (one half) from Packiri Ammal or her descendants and therefore no relief is sought for in the present suit in respect of the one half bequeathed to Packiri Ammal.

4. The plaintiff would further submit that as stated above, Annapoorani, Kamalambal and Pattammal were each entitled to 1/3rd share of 1 /2 of 'B' schedule property i.e. 1/6th share in the 'A' schedule property; that Annapoorani had executed an agreement of sale of her 1/3 rd share in the 'B' schedule property in favour of the plaintiff on 18.11.1964 for Rs.1,250/= and had received an advance of Rs.750/= from the plaintiff and further had agreed to receive the balance of Rs.500/= at the time of execution of sale deed, but before execution of the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff, Annapoorani died and her daughter Gowri and son Dakshinamurthy refused to execute the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff and hence the plaintiff filed a suit in O.S. No.18 of 1977 on the file of the Court of District Munsif, Tiruvarur for specific performance of the agreement dated 18.11.1964; that in the said suit, the defendant herein was also impleaded as the 3rd defendant

but was later exonerated; that the said suit was decreed on 10.10 .1977 and the plaintiff filed E.P.38 of 1978 and since the defendants therein viz. Gowri and Dakshinamurthi did not execute the sale deed on receipt of notice with draft sale deed from the Court, the trial Court executed the sale deed on 16.10.1978 in favour of the plaintiff and registered the same on 2.11.1978 in favour of the plaintiff in respect of 1/3rd share of 'B' schedule property i.e. 1/6th in respect of 'A' schedule property.

5. The further case of the plaintiff is that the plaintiff has also purchased another 1/6th share in 'B' schedule property held by Kamalambal from her heirs viz. Ramaiah and Sellammal under a registered sale deed dated 25.12.1976 for consideration; that another daughter of Govindammal viz. Pattammal who had also an 1/3rd share in the 'B' schedule property had two daughters namely Rajalakshmi and Pushbavalli alias Santhanalakshmi; that Rajalakshmi had an 1/12th share in the 'B' schedule property, the other half going to Pushpavalli alias Santhanalakshmi; that it is only the 1/12th share held by Rajalakshmi that could be properly conveyed to the defendant in pursuance of the High Court judgment in S.A.No.660 of 1970; that the plaintiff has purchased the 1/12th share held by Pushpavalli alias Santhanalakshmi under a registered sale deed dated 25.12.1976 for consideration thus the plaintiff is entitled to a 5/12th share in the 'A' schedule property and possession thereof; that the defendant is estopped from questioning the right of the plaintiff to have a fair division by metes and bounds and this suit is laid for partition and separate possession of 5/12 th share in the 'A' schedule property in favour of the plaintiff and the plaintiff and defendant are co-owners and they are in joint possession.

6. The plaintiff would further submit that the defendant is not a bonafide purchaser for value insofar as it relates to the 'B' schedule property from Rajalakshmi, however, in view of the High Court's judgment in S.A.660 of 1970, the defendant cannot raise any valid objection to this suit for partition; that as a matter of fact, the High Court has held in the presence of the defendant that the plaintiff's predecessor Annapoorani is entitled to an 1/3rd share in the 'B' schedule property and that right was worked out in O.S.No.18 of 1977 by the plaintiff; that the defendant raised a plea in the High Court that he had spent Rs.8,000/= in improving the suit property; that the High Court has observed in C.M.P.No.7931 of 1970 and C.M.P.No.9712 of 1970 that the improvements effected by the defendant shall be deemed to have been done at his risk and that the defendant will be answerable for the cost of the building which stood on the land on the date of filing of suit and that Annapoorani will not be liable to pay any compensation for the alleged improvements or reconstruction made by the defendant and the defendant did not raise any other plea in the High Court and is therefore estopped from pleading against a partition decree in this suit.

7. The defendant filed a written statement thereby denying all the allegations of the plaint and further submitting that there is nothing in 'A' schedule to show what identifiable part of it is 'B' schedule and the 'B' schedule property cannot be identified and hence the suit has to be dismissed in limine; that the defendant is not aware of the truth, validity and enforceability of the Will of Velu Pillai; that even if the Will is true,

this defendant understands that Velu Pillai did not divide the house into two halves but into separate portions like room, kitchen etc. and allotted the same to daughter Govindammal and her son one defined portion in the house and the defined portion of his other daughter Pakkiri Ammal; that the property mentioned as 'B' schedule to the alleged Will of Velu Pilai is not 'A' schedule to the plaint and therefore the plaint fails on this single ground.

8. The defendant would further submit that it is true that Govindammal and Rajalakshmi filed R.C.O.P.2 of 1962 on the file of the Court of District Munsif, Tiruvarur on ground that Govindammal owned the entire house viz. 'B' schedule to the present plaint that she had settled the same on Rajalakshmi and succeeded and when Rajalakshmi wanted to take possession, she was obstructed by Annapoorani which was removed and delivery of possession was given to Rajammal in 1963; that this defendant was not a party in O.S.No.222 of 1964 either before the trial Court or in the first appellate Court in both of which Rajalakshmi succeeded and only in the Second Appeal No.660 of 1970, this defendant was added as a party; that the other defined portion of 'A' schedule was bequeathed to Packiri Ammal, another daughter of Velu Pillai mentioned as 'C' schedule to the Will absolutely; that Govindammal' s case was that she was the full owner of the entire house shown as ' B' schedule to the plaint; that Govindammal, in her turn, settled the 'A' schedule to the plaint in favour of Rajalakshmi Ammal under a settlement deed dated 10.2.1961; that Rajalakshmi, in her turn, sold the 'A' schedule to the plaint in favour of Lakshmibai by a registered sale deed dated 21.1.1970 and this defendant became the full owner of the 'A' schedule plaint properties; that on the date of the sale deed in favour of this defendant, two Courts had held that Rajalakshmi was the full owner of the entire house i.e. 'A' schedule to the plaint; that this defendant is a bonafide purchaser for value without notice of any defect in title of his vendor and has prescribed title by adverse possession to the entire 'B' and and 'C' schedule properties mentioned in the Will of Velu Pillai.

9. The defendant would further submit that from the date of this purchase, the defendant and his predecessors have been in possession of the entire house i.e. 'B' schedule to the suit; that after purchase, this defendant has demolished the old house entirely and has put up the new building at a cost of Rs.30,000/=; that the plaintiff and all others kept quiet when the defendant was spending money and labour over the property and the plaintiff is estopped from claiming any right in the property; that in fact, in the second appeal itself, in a C.M.P., the High Court has held that the defendant can build the house and if Annapoorni succeeds, she will be entitled only to the costs of the old building which stood on the land on the date of suit; that in the second appeal, the High Court has not held that alienation by Govindammal is void as stated in the plaint; that the plaintiff or his alleged predecessors in title have no possession whatsoever within thirty years and above; that the right, if any, to the plaintiff is ceased by lapse of time; that the plaintiff and her alleged predecessors in interest have no possession within the statutory period of limitation and hence this suit is clearly out of time and barred by limitation; that the present suit has been framed as one for partition alone and hence the same is not legally maintainable; that the suit is liable to be rejected as there is no prayer and

payment of court fee for setting aside the alienations.

10. The defendant would further submit that the plaint has been filed without understanding the proper perspective of the High Court judgment referred to in the plaint and in any event, the judgment has no application to more than 1/3rd share; that the plaintiff will not be entitled to any remedy in the suit as she has arranged to create purchase deeds knowing fully well the litigation in the property; that the defendant does not admit the truth, validity of the alleged purchase of shares in the property and the deeds are hit by law of champerty and maintenance; that no second suit for partition will lie; that the plaintiff can only implead herself in the suit in O.S.No.224 of 1 974 and work out her remedy if law permits and the suit is barred by res-judicata; that there is no door No.12; that the High Court also took only one Number i.e. No.11; that the defendant has been exonerated in O.S.No.18 of 1977 and hence the finding, if any, given in that suit, will not bind the defendant. On such averments, the defendant would pray to dismiss the suit with costs.

11. Based on the above pleadings, the trial Court has framed the following issues for determination:
1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any and what share?
2. Whether the defendant has prescribed title to and 'B' schedule properties by adverse possession?
3. Whether the suit is not properly valued and proper court fees paid?
4. Whether the suit is barred by res judicata by reason of the judgment in O.S.222 of 1964?

5. Whether this Court has no pecuniary jurisdiction?
6.To what relief is the plaintiff entitled?

Thereupon, the trial Court conducted a trial wherein on behalf of the plaintiff, her husband would be examined as P.W.1 for oral evidence and six documents would be marked as Exs.A.1 to A.6 for documentary evidence, Ex.A.1 being the copy of the Will dated 29.4.1914 executed by Velu Pillai, Ex.A.2 dated 2.2.1973 being the copy of the judgment rendered in S.A.No.660 of 1970 by the High Court, Madras, Ex.A.3 dated 16.10.1978 is the sale deed executed in favour of the plaintiff by the District Munsif Court, Tiruvarur, Ex.A.4 dated 25.12.1976 is the sale deed executed in favour of the plaintiff by Ramaiah and others, Ex.A.5 dated 25.12.1976 is the sale deed executed in favour of plaintiff by Papammal and others and Ex.A.6 dated 21.7.1970 is the copy of the order made in C.M.P.Nos.7931 and 9712 of 1970 in S.A.No.660 of 197 0 by the High Court, Madras.

12. On the other hand, the defendant would examine himself as D.W.1 for oral evidence and would mark eight documents for documentary evidence as Exs.B.1 to B.8. Ex.B.1 dated 10.2.1961 is the copy of the settlement deed executed by Govindammal in favour of Rajalakshmi, Ex. B.2 dated 16.3.1962 is the sale deed executed by Rajalakshmi in favour of Lakshmibai, Ex.B.3 dated 21.1.1970 is the sale deed executed by Lakshmibai in favour of the defendant and Exs.B.4 to B.8 are the receipts for paying house-tax by the defendant.

13. In appreciation of the above evidence placed on record, the trial Court has ultimately decreed the suit in respect of 'A' schedule of property alone with costs. Aggrieved, the defendant in the suit has preferred an appeal in A.S.No.156 of 1989 before the Court of District Judge, Nagapattinam and the said Court having appreciated the evidence placed on record and having framed its own point for consideration, has ultimately allowed the appeal thereby dismissing the suit. It is only against the said

finding rendered by the first appellate Court, the plaintiff has come forward to prefer the above second appeal and this Court admitted the same for determination of the following substantial questions of law:

1.Whether the lower Court is right in dismissing a suit for partition as not maintainable when the plaintiff's right to a share is not disputed on the ground that the defendant has made improvement in the original property to which the plaintiff's share is already declared by the High Court Judgment?

2.Whether the lower Court is right in holding that the judgment given by the High Court in favour of the person in respect of suit property will not ensure to the legal heirs or successor to the rights of original owner?

14. During arguments, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant would submit that the plaintiff is the appellant in the above second appeal and the suit is for partition and separate possession of the plaintiff's 5/12 shares in the suit property; that the respondent/defendant is the co-owner; that the trial court decreed the suit as prayed for, but the appellate court reversed the finding of the trial court; that the suit properties fall under door Nos.11 and 12 of Vadamboki Street, which were originally belonging to one Velupillai, who had three daughters, who executed Ex.A.1 Will dated 29.4.1914; that as per the recitals of the Will, Govindammal had only a life estate; that Pakkiriammal's shares had been purchased by the respondent/ defendant; that Govindammal executed the settlement deed in favour of Rajalakshmi, her granddaughter through her daughter Pattammal; that S.A.No.660 of 1970 was allowed decreeing the suit under Ex.A.2, and therefore, ultimately, the appellant/plaintiff became entitled to 5/12 shares.

15. On the part of the respondents, the learned counsel would not only advance oral arguments, but also would submit written submissions, wherein he would subject that there is no unity in title and possession; that once a preliminary decree is passed, the joint family status comes to an end and there is severed ends of joint family. Learned counsel would rely upon the judgments reported in (i) JT 1996 (11) S.C.20 (ANIL KUMAR MITRA & ORS. v. GANENDRA NATH MITRA & ORS.), (ii) AIR 1938 P.C. 189 (HARKISHAN SINGH v. PARTAP SINGH) and (iii) AIR 192 3 Patna 162 (NANDKESHWAR v. SUDARSHAN).

16. So far as the first judgment cited above is concerned, it is held therein:
"after passing of preliminary decree in title suit, the joint family status existing prior to the date came to a terminus and there is no presumption that both coparceners continued to be members of the joint

family."

So far as the second judgment cited above is concerned, it is held therein:
"Once the shares are defined, there is a severance of the
joint status. The parties may then make a physical division of the property
or they may decide to live together and enjoy the property in common."

So far as the third judgment cited above is concerned, it is held therein:
"that in a suit for partition, both unity of title and
possession are necessary -- In order to succeed in a suit for partition, there
must not only be the unity of title but there must be unity of possession and
if, plaintiff is not in possession of the properties, he is not entitled to a
decree for partition."
Learned counsel would point out that preliminary decree for partition had been passed by this Court in S.A.No.660 of 1970 on 2.2.1973, and therefore, the joint family status has come to an end then itself.

17. Learned counsel would further submit that the appellant/
plaintiff is claiming through Annapoorani, who entered into a sale agreement dated 18.11.1964 in respect of 1/3 shares in the 'B' schedule; that to enforce this sale agreement, the appellant/plaintiff filed O.S. No.18 of 1977 for specific performance; that on the face of it, the suit is hit by limitation; that the respondent/defendant was made a party in the said suit and later he was given up; that the legal heirs of Annapoorani had abandoned their claims in respect of the joint family properties and the appellant herein cannot seek to step into their shoes; that in any case, the respondent/defendant has perfected his title by adverse possession; that the successive events of the respondent being in possession, making improvements in the property and demolishing the old structure, all would go together to constitute an ouster; that he purchased the property without any notice of defect in title; that he is a bona fide purchaser for value; that he made considerable improvements in the property; that the judgment in S.A.No.660 of 1970 is confined only to Annapoorani's 1/3 shares in the 'B' schedule; that the appellant was clearly out of possession; that seeking a preliminary decree in respect of the so-called 5/12 shares is clearly not maintainable. On such arguments, learned counsel would pray to dismiss the second appeal.

18. In consideration of the facts pleaded by parties, having
regard to the materials placed on record and upon hearing the learned counsel for both, it comes to be seen that it is a suit for partition and separate possession of the suit properties into 12 shares and for allotting five such divided shares in favour of the appellant, she has filed the suit on the ground that the deceased Velupillai, under Ex. A.1 sale deed dated 29.4.1914, bequeathed the suit properties in favour of his heirs, from whom, it is alleged that the appellant has purchased 5/12 shares and for the division of the same in partition by metes and bounds and for allotting five such shares that she is entitled to in the suit properties and for handing over physical possession of the same, the appellant/plaintiff has come forward to file the suit.
19. The suit properties fall under door Nos.11 and 12 of
Vadamboki Street, in which, exactly, half of the portion is falling under the

'B' schedule and there is no denying of the fact on the part both the parties that the entire suit properties were originally belonging to deceased Velupillai, who had three daughters and they had their own children, pertaining to which, there is no dispute among parties; that the deceased Velupillai divided the suit properties into two halves and bequeathed in favour of one of his daughters, viz., Govindammal and her son Govindasamy the half of the suit properties, which falls under 'B' schedule, thus having conferred with only life estate on them and thereafter conferring absolute rights of their heirs. Likewise, the other half falling under the 'C' schedule has been bequeathed in favour of Pakkiriammal conferring absolute rights on her, which falls under 'C' schedule and the same is alleged to have been purchased by the deceased first respondent.

20. The case of the appellant is that she purchased from the heirs of Govindammal and Govindasamy 5/12 shares from out of 'B' schedule. There have been a lot of successive events in the succession of the properties of Govindammal, particularly in view of the fact that her son Govindasamy pre-deceased her, as a result of which, she settled her properties in favour of her granddaughter Rajalakshmi under Ex.B.1 settlement dated 10.2.1961, which having become the subject matter of the suit in O.S.No.222 of 1964, which had ultimately been decided in favour of the said Rajalakshmi in the second appeal and having undergone such developments, ultimately, the appellant purchased from the respective later owners the 5/12 shares, regarding which, seeking for a partition and separate possession of her shares, she has filed the suit.

21. On the part of the respondent/defendant, he would come forward to say that he purchased the 'C' schedule properties from the owners and dubbing the properties as a family property, he would come forward to put restrictions in the light of certain judgments rendered regarding the joint family properties, which is absolutely not applicable to the case in hand. However, in appreciation of the facts and circumstances of the case and the position of law encircling the subject and framing proper issues for determination of all the questions involved in the suit, the trial court would decide decreeing the suit as prayed for, but the first appellate court, appreciating the evidence in a different manner, has arrived at different conclusions so as to allow the appeal setting aside the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court in favour of the appellant as a result of which the

appellant/plaintiff has come forward to prefer the above second appeal on grounds as brought forth in the grounds of appeal for determination of the substantial questions of law extracted in para 13 supra.

22. It is a simple suit for partition and separate possession of the appellant's 5/12 shares in the suit 'A' schedule properties as discussed in the preceding paragraphs. The original owner of the entire suit properties, Thiru.Velu Pillai, as per the recitals of his last Will and Testament executed Ex.A1 dated 29.4.1914, dividing the properties into two halves that is schedule 'B' and 'C', devolved 'B' schedule properties in favour of Govindammal giving her life estate, her descendants being conferred with absolute right over the property. The plaintiff's case is that she

purchased the same from the descendants of Govindammal and Govindasamy, likewise the other properties categorised under 'C' schedule having been allotted to the share of another daughter of Velu Pillai, namely Pakkiriammal, the said property having gone into several hands would ultimately come to be purchased by the defendants in the suit and therefore, it is the case of the plaintiff that she purchased the entire portion from the descendants of Govindammal and Govindasamy and seeking for a partition of her 5/12 shares in the whole of the suit properties, she has come forward to file the suit. The defendants have purchased from either Pakkiriammal or her descendants who became entitled to the 'C' schedule property in the already mentioned Will. But, in spite of the trial Court having arrived at the conclusion to decree the suit as prayed for thereby passing a preliminary decree in favour of the appellant/plaintiff, the first appellate Court would set aside the said judgment arriving at different conclusions that the plaintiff is not entitled to the 5/12 shares as prayed for in the suit.

23. In the above circumstances, this Court has to answer the substantial questions of law already framed. The first appellate Court is able to arrive at the conclusions different from that of the trial Court, since on the part of the respondents they have pleaded joint family status and the improvements alleged to have been effected in some of the portions of the properties which have absolutely no bearing on the case in hand since the shares of parties should be decided strictly in accordance with the recitals of the Will dated 29.4.1914 and in such event the question of joint family status neither comes to be established in evidence nor could such a status be imagined by the purchasers of the properties to have existed generations before particularly when there is Ex.A1 Will duly executed by the original owner Velu Pillai and it is only reasonable and legal to accept the Will and go in accordance with the recitals of the same without indulging in imaginary exercises and hence the judgments submitted on the part of the respondents presuming joint family status cannot be applied to the case in hand. Therefore, the only alternative left with is the Will and the share purchased by the plaintiff and whether the deal has been done in accordance with law following the recitals of the Will or not and when the plaintiff□s right to the share is not disputed, the plea that the defendant has made improvements in the original property would not in any manner affect the rights of the plaintiff to have her own share of the properties as claimed in the suit. Therefore, the first substantial question of law as framed is to be answered in favour of the plaintiff as declared and decreed by the trial Court thereby passing a preliminary decree in favour of the appellant/ plaintiff.
24. Coming to the second substantial question of law, there cannot be any doubt entertained normally regarding the judgment of the High Court or for the matter by any court in favour of a person in respect of a suit property would definitely ensure to the legal heirs or successors of the original owner unless very strong reasons or legal grounds are there and for such reasons assigned the said dictum is set aside or varied for valuable reasons assigned by the upper forum of law and therefore, easy decision could be arrived at answering this substantial question of law that in the circumstances of the case the lower appellate Court is wrong in holding that the judgment given by the High Court in respect of the suit property in favour of any person will not ensure to the legal heirs or successors of the original owner and hence

this substantial question of law has also to be decided only in favour of the appellant/plaintiff and hence the following decision.

25. On a overall consideration of the above second appeal in the light of the facts and circumstances and further in the light of the judgment of the trial Court in appreciation of the evidence and that of the first appellate Court as well, the above substantial questions of law are answered in favour of the appellant/plaintiff, and hence the following judgment:
In result,
(i) the above second appeal succeeds and the same is allowed;
(ii) the judgment and decree dated 15.11.1990 rendered in A.S.No.2 5 of 1990 by the Court of Subordinate Judge, Nagapattinam is set aside;
(iii) the judgment and decree dated 5.5.1989 rendered in O.S.No.3 43 of 1982 by the Court of District Munsif, Thiruvarur is restored;
(iv) however, there shall be no order as to costs.
(v) Consequently, C.M.P.No.10814 of 1991 is closed.

Index:Yes
Internet:Yes

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To
1. The Subordinate Judge, Nagapattinam.
2. The District Munsif, Thiruvarur.